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EQUAL BENEFITS, EQUAL BURDENS:
"SKEPTICAL SCRUTINY" FOR
GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS AFTER
UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA
However "liberally" [the Virginia Military Institute] plan
serves the State's sons, it makes no provision whatever for
her daughters. That is not equal protection.
-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1872 Supreme Court Justice Bradley wrote, "Man is, or
should be, woman's protector and defender.... The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.",2 To
this end, the Court upheld Illinois's prohibition of the practice of
law by women.
How far we've come. Women are not only increasingly enter-
ing the highest ranks of the legal profession3 but are also protecting
and defending our nation in record numbers.4 With the appoint-
ment of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court in 1993,5
feminist legal scholars were optimistic about her potential influ-
1. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,2279 (1996).
2. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
3. See David Segal, Meet the Women Rainmakers: They're Generating Big In-
come for Law Firms and Changing the Face of a Clubby Profession, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 1996, at Fl. ("'[Wlhile women have gone a long way toward breaking barri-
ers, and are coming into the profession in large numbers, the glass ceiling is alive and
well."' (quoting Cory Amron, former chairwoman of the ABA's Commission on
Women)).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 339-44.
5. Justice Ginsburg was appointed by President Bill Clinton and was the first
Justice appointed by a Democratic president since 1967. See Joyce Ann Baugh et al.,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment, 26 U. TOL. L. REy. 1, 2
(1994). Her appointment spurred hopeful predictions that she would nudge the Su-
preme Court to re-energize liberal decisions of Chief Justice Earl Warren's Court in
the 1960s, decisions that the current regime under Chief Justice William Rehnquist
all but vanquished. See id. at 2-3.
1333
1334 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ence on the Court's decisions regarding women.6 This optimism
was inspired by her vision of a "[b]oldly dynamic interpretation,
departing radically from the original understanding... to tie to the
... equal protection clause a command that government treat men
and women as individuals, equal in rights, responsibilities and op-
portunities., 7 These hopes for change in gender jurisprudence be-
came reality in June 1996 with the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Virginia (VMI), 8 which required the all-male Vir-
ginia Military Institute (VMI) to admit women.9
In writing for the majority in VMI, Justice Ginsburg seized on
the opportunity to articulate a new equal protection standard,
which she dubbed "skeptical scrutiny."'" This new test for gender
classifications is significant in both feminist jurisprudence and con-
stitutional legal theory. The VMI decision addresses a core issue
of feminist jurisprudence: should men and women be treated the
same or differently? The Supreme Court opted for the former in
requiring qualified women to be provided the same educational
opportunity as men.11
From a constitutional law perspective, the VMI decision rep-
resents a doctrinal shift in the Court's treatment of gender classifi-
cations. The heart of this shift is the evolution of the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification," which appeared in earlier
cases involving gender discrimination.' 2 The Court gave this
phrase new meaning in VMI by placing a higher burden on parties
seeking to uphold a gender classification. 13 While the Court still
reserves the strictest judicial scrutiny for classifications based on
6. "Although Ruth Bader Ginsburg's name was unfamiliar to the general public
when President Clinton proposed her for the Supreme Court, she was much admired
by many feminists who describe her as 'the major architect of constitutional issues
for women' in recent years." Helen Lillie, Husbands Who Are Not Afraid to Be
Proud of Their Wives, HERALD (Glasgow), July 15, 1993, at 10. Feminists hoped that
Justice Ginsburg's appointment would "restore the 'f' word [feminism] to polite po-
litical conversation." Louise Bernikow, Let's Hear It for the 'F' Word, NEWSDAY,
June 18, 1993, at 62.
7. Jeffrey Rosen, The Book of Ruth, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 1993, at 19, 30.
8. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
9. In text, the italicized "VMP' refers to the 1996 Supreme Court decision and
ordinary roman "VMI" refers to the educational institution.
10. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
11. See id. at 2287.
12. See id. at 2274; see also infra Part II.C (tracing the development of intermedi-
ate scrutiny).
13. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
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race or national origin, 4 the Court is clearly moving toward a more
stringent level of scrutiny for gender discrimination.' 5 As a result
of this shift, it is an appropriate time for the Court to reconsider
some of its prior decisions upholding outmoded gender classifica-
tions, including Rostker v. Goldberg,16 which upheld the all-male
draft registration.
This Note takes both a retrospective and prospective ap-
proach to analyzing the intermediate scrutiny standard as applied
by the United States Supreme Court. Part II briefly traces the de-
velopment of the intermediate scrutiny standard for gender dis-
crimination cases. Part III focuses on the Supreme Court's appli-
cation of intermediate scrutiny to cases involving single-sex
education and the military, both philosophies directly impacting
the VMI decision. Focusing primarily on the courts' conflicting
approaches in dealing with sex differences, Part IV outlines the
equal protection analysis of the lower court decisions leading up to
the Supreme Court's articulation of its new standard in VML Part
V addresses the challenges of implementing the VMI decision by
looking at The Citadel's decision to abandon its all-male admis-
sions policy. In light of the stricter standards of intermediate scru-
tiny developed in VMI, Part VI invites a reconsideration of Rost-
ker, which precludes women's participation in draft registration.
This Note concludes that developments in gender discrimination
law and the reality of women's increased participation in the mili-
tary mandate overturning Rostker and lifting the few remaining re-
strictions on women from serving in combat.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR
GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
17
prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender for people who are
similarly situated. 8 While this is a universally agreed-upon pro-
14. See id.
15. See infra Part IV.F.5.
16. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (striking
down workers' compensation law that required a widower but not a widow to prove
dependence on spouse in order to qualify for benefits); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (invalidating state statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the
age of 21 and females under 18); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (striking down
statute providing for a parental support obligation for sons until age 21 but for
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tection, the question of appropriate judicial scrutiny remains un-
clear.1 9 Over the past thirty years the standard of review for gen-
der discrimination cases has evolved from a deferential analysis to
a more searching inquiry culminating in the "intermediate scru-
tiny" standard. 2° Throughout this development, the Court has
adopted two separate analyses: (1) the important governmental
interests test21 and (2) the exceedingly persuasive justification
test.22 These two tests merged in Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan,23 which gave rise to the current shift in intermediate
scrutiny spearheaded by Justice Ginsburg.
A. Early Developments
Until the early 1970s, the Court routinely upheld discrimina-
tory laws that were rationally related to government purposes re-
flecting traditional views of the "proper" relationship between
men and women. 4 Reed v. Reeds marked the turning point in the
Court's policy of deferring to the states those judgments regarding
the role of women.26 In Reed the Court unanimously invalidated
an Idaho statute requiring that males be preferred to equally enti-
tled females in the appointment of persons to administer an intes-
tate estate.27 The Court employed a "rational relationship, 28 test
to conclude that "a mandatory preference to members of either
sex over members of the other.., is to make the very kind of arbi-
daughters only until age 18); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating statutory
preference of males to administer an estate over equally entitled females).
19. Prior to VMI, equal protection jurisprudence "evaluate[d] everything under
the sun by applying one of three tests: 'rational basis' scrutiny, intermediate scru-
tiny, or strict scrutiny." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2292 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. See infra notes 45-52.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
24. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-25, at 1559
(2d ed. 1988); see, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley,
J., concurring) (upholding the state's prohibition of women to practice law). Ironi-
cally, in the same reporter Justice Bradley argued: "[T]he right of any citizen to fol-
low whatever lawful employment he chooses to adopt ... is one of his most valuable
rights, and one which the legislature of a State cannot invade .... ." Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 113-14 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). Apparently Justice Bradley's use of the male pronoun was not simply a mat-
ter of stylistic convention.
25. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
26. See TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-26, at 1561.
27. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 73, 77.
28. Id at 76.
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trary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 29 The state defended its prefer-
ential statute by arguing that it furthered legitimate state interests:
reducing the workload on probate courts and avoiding intra-
family controversy.3  While rational basis scrutiny generally be-
speaks deference, 32 Reed is unique for employing the rational basis
test to invalidate a state law despite the state's articulation of le-
gitimate interests for its passage.
Reed established that the Equal Protection Clause mandates
that similarly situated persons be treated alike.34 Conversely, dif-
ferent classes of persons may be treated differently.35 But Reed did
not address whether men and women may be deemed similarly
situated despite inherent biological differences. Moreover, Reed
sparked the debate over whether certain gender differences are
real or whether they are based on gender stereotypes.
B. Important Governmental Interest
Even though Reed used the language of rational basis review,
the decision makes sense only if we assume that "some special
sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis.,
37
This assumption became explicit in Frontiero v. Richardson,38 in
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 77.
32. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a presumptive ex-
emption for women to serve on juries while requiring men to request an exemption),
overruled in part by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute prohibiting the licensing of female bartenders
unless their husbands or fathers owned the bar in which they worked), overruled by
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). "The Court in Goesaert did not even consider
the possibility that the bar might be owned by a woman." TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-
25, at 1561 n.15.
33. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 198 ("Decisions following Reed similarly have rejected
administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify
gender-based classifications.").
34. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
35. See id at 75.
36. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
37. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972).
38. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause federal statutes classifying spouses of male members of the armed services as
"dependents" for purposes of obtaining military benefits, while spouses of female
members were not "dependents" unless they could show actual proof of depend-
ency).
April 1997] 1337
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which the plurality found "at least implicit support" in Reed for
treating gender-like race-as a suspect classification subject to
strict scrutiny. The Court analogized sex and race in the follow-
ing manner: "[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect sta-
tuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the
recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently70
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."
The Frontiero Court struck down a military benefits scheme that
more heavily burdened the spouses of female members of the mili-
tary; the Supreme Court described the effect of the scheme as
"'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage. 4 1 While the Court may have found
sex to be a suspect classification in Frontiero,42 it refrained from
developing a judicial standard of review until its decision in Craig
v. Boren43 three years later.
With then-ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg filing an
amicus curiae brief, 4 the Craig Court adopted "middle-tier" scru-
tiny-later termed "intermediate scrutiny"-as the judicial stan-
dard of review in gender discrimination cases.45 To withstand con-
stitutional challenge under this standard of review, classifications
based on gender must pass two hurdles: (1) the classification
"must serve important governmental objectives" and (2) "must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 6
Using this test, the Craig Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under twenty-
one and females under eighteen.47 While the Court agreed that
39. Md at 682.
40. 1& at 686.
41. Id. at 684.
42. See id. at 688 ("[Wle can only conclude that classifications based upon sex...
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
But see id at 692 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether
sex was a suspect classification, pending consideration by the states of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment).
43. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
44. See id at 191 n.* (unnumbered footnote in original).
45. See id. at 210-11 n.* (unnumbered footnote in original) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell did not endorse a further subdivision of equal protection
analysis, but conceded that deferential rational basis review "takes on a sharper fo-
cus when we address a gender-based classification." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Id at 197. This discussion is applicable only to statutes that expressly differ-
entiate between the sexes. Statutes that are gender-neutral on their face yet have
discriminatory impacts are beyond the scope of this Note.
47. See id. at 210.
[Vol. 30:1333
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traffic safety was an important governmental objective,4 the state's
statistics did "not satisfy [the Court] that sex represents a legiti-
mate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and 
driving. 149
The Court concluded that the statistics were distorted as a result of
social stereotypes; "'reckless' young men who drink and drive are
transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counter-
parts are chivalrously escorted home."5 Since Craig the Court has
employed intermediate scrutiny to strike down laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, whether it be male or female.5 '
C. Exceedingly Persuasive Justification
Running parallel to the Craig test is another line of cases
holding that intermediate scrutiny requires an "exceedingly per-
suasive justification" to uphold the gender classification. The
Court first coined this phrase in dicta in Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney.2 The statute in Feeney provided that veterans who qualify
for state civil service positions be considered for appointment
ahead of any qualifying nonveterans.5 The basis of the suit was
that very few women could qualify for the preference as a result of
the various federal statutes, regulations, and policies restricting the
number of women eligible to enlist in the armed forces.54 The
Court stated in dicta that a law which covertly or overtly discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex "would require an exceedingly persuasive
justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the
48. See id. at 199.
49. Id. at 204. The government provided statistics showing a high correlation be-
tween gender- and alcohol-related traffic accidents. See id. at 200-04.
50. Id. at 202 n.14.
51. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking
down a state school's all-female admissions policy); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455 (1981) (unanimously striking down a Louisiana law that gave a husband-as
head and master of property jointly owned with his wife-the unilateral right to dis-
pose of such property without his wife's consent); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76
(1979) (striking down a provision of the Social Security Act that provided benefits to
dependent children of unemployed fathers but not those of unemployed mothers);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating a New York law that gave
unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, unilateral power to block adoption of their
children by withholding consent). But see Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464
(1981) (upholding California's statutory rape law, which holds only men criminally
liable). Ironically, the Michael M. decision immediately follows Kirchberg in the of-
ficial reporter, each case standing at opposite poles of the Court's treatment of gen-
der discrimination cases.
52. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
53. See id. at 259.
54. See id. at 269-70.
1339April 19971
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."55 The
Feeney Court declined to apply its exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation standard by concluding that the statute did not classify on
the basis of gender.6 Rather, the Court construed the statute to
prefer veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex-not
males over females.Y
The seminal case incorporating the Feeney standard into gen-
der jurisprudence is Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,58
which required the university's all-female nursing program to grant
academic credit to men. The Hogan Court required that a party
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies on the basis of gender
"must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive jus-
tification"' for that classification. The Court further stated that
this "burden is met only by showing at least that the classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discrimina-
tory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives.""' In this way, the Hogan Court equated
the Feeney exceedingly persuasive justification standard with the
Craig important governmental objective standard. 1 By melding
these two tests, the Hogan Court raised the requirements for up-
holding a gender classification under intermediate scrutiny.
After Hogan lower courts used the exceedingly persuasive
justification test to overturn legislation discriminating on the basis
of gender. 2 For example, in Adams v. Bakers the district courtgranted a preliminary injunction allowing plaintiff Tiffany Adams
55. See id. at 273.
56. See id. at 280.
57. See id.
58. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
59. Id. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1979)).
60. Id (emphasis added) (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142,150 (1980)).
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding high
school's policy of excluding women from wrestling team tryout not exceedingly per-
suasive); Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994) (holding state policy of
providing single-sex education at The Citadel to men and not to women violated
equal protection), affd, modified, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
352 (1995); Cook v. Babbitt, 819 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) (striking down museum's
policy barring women from portraying male soldiers at Living History reenactments
of the Civil War); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 576 F. Supp.
837 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (invalidating use of sex-based tables to determine present value
of reversionary interests).
63. 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996).
[Vol. 30:1333
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to try out for the all-male high school wrestling team 4 The school
district's claim that the plaintiff's gender put her at greater risk of
injury was based on generalized assumgtions about the relative
physical strength of males and females. In rejecting the school
district's safety argument as overly paternalistic, the court con-
cluded that an exceedingly persuasive justification was not found
since safety was not substantially related to prohibiting females
from wrestling.66
The exceedingly persuasive standard promises to be the key to
toughening the intermediate scrutiny standard. Soon after Justice
Ginsburg's appointment in 1993, she wrote: "Indeed, even under
the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, which requires 'an ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification' for a gender-based classification,
it remains an open question whether 'classifications based upon
gender are inherently suspect."'6 7 With this simple statement, Jus-
tice Ginsburg foreshadowed later decisions, including VMI, which
incrementally move towards the notion that gender classifications
are indeed inherently suspect.
III. APPLICATION OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE MILITARY
Public single-sex education and the military are the focus of
this Note because they represent the two paradigms of existing
governmental gender discrimination. Single-sex admissions poli-
cies are generally invalidated while discriminatory regulations in
the military are generally untouched. How are these different out-
comes accounted for? The difference depends on the level of re-
view. Challenges to single-sex educational institutions are subject
to the more rigorous exceedingly persuasive justification test of
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.6 In stark contrast, the
Court has carved out an exception for military affairs cases such
that they must satisfy only rational basis review.69 The Court was
confronted by each of these paradigms in deciding VMI, a public
single-sex educational institution that trains, at least in part, for the
64. See id. at 1505.
65. See id. at 1504.
66. See id. at 1503-04.
67. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 26 n.* (unnumbered footnote in original)
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724
& n.9).
68. 458 U.S. 718 (1982); see supra Part II.C.
69. See supra Part II.A.
April 1997]
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military.
A. Public Single-Sex Educational Institutions
Gender discrimination claims against public single-sex institu-
tions prior to VMI required the state to establish an exceedingly
persuasive justification under Hogan to sustain the classification."
Courts' decisions abandoning single-sex educational institutions
have cut both ways: both all-male and all-female institutions have
been forced to integrate.7' Regardless of which sex is excluded, the
same level of scrutiny is applied.72 Most importantly, the test for
determining the validity of gender-based classifications "must be
applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females." 3
Yet the Supreme Court has not relegated public single-sex
education to a bygone era. A state may maintain an affirmative
action single-sex admissions policy if the plan's purpose is to com-
pensate for past discrimination.74 However, if the exclusion of one
sex serves to perpetuate stereotyped views of a particular profes-




Congress is accorded virtual autonomy in matters of national
defense, including the right to classify similarly situatedpersons on7617
the basis of sex. Most notably, in Rostker v. Goldberg the Court
upheld Congress's decision requiring only men to register for the
70. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
71. Compare id. at 761 (allowing men to audit courses in the nursing program,
but not granting them academic credit, violated equal protection), with Kirstein v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970) (holding
that University of Virginia's all-male admissions policy violated equal protection).
72. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723 ("That this statutory policy discriminates against
males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the
standard of review.").
73. Id. at 724-25.
74. See id. at 728. Whether a state may maintain a compensatory or remedial all-
male program is uncertain after the VMI decision. See infra note 303.
75. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 (finding that all-female nursing school per-
petuated the stereotyped view of nursing as the exclusive province of women).
76. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) ("The case arises in the
context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and per-
haps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.").
77. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
[Vol. 30:1333
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military draft.8  The majority opinion, written by Justice
Rehnquist, reasoned that since only men could be sent into battle,
the sexes were not similarly situated with regard to conscription.79
Justice Rehnquist "turned equal protection analysis on its head by
arguing that the government did not need women to achieve mili-
tary readiness"; therefore, the government was "free to discrimi-
nate against women by conducting an all-male draft."80 In contrast
to the Court's application of intermediate scrutiny in cases involv-
ing educational institutions, rational basis is applied in military af-
fairs cases, even if it serves to perpetuate gender stereotypes."
Under the Rostker holding, one cannot help but ask, how much
have we changed since Justice Bradley's paternalistic description
of man as woman's protector and defender in 1872?n
In addition to the Court's deferential approach to cases involv-
ing draft registration and combat, it generally upholds statutes in-
volving military benefits that differentiate between men and
women. In particular, the Court upholds disparate treatment of
78. See id. at 83. While Rostker can be justified as a "military affairs" case with-
out upsetting the rubric of intermediate scrutiny, it coincided with a backlash of cases
upholding state laws discriminating on the basis of sex that cannot be so easily justi-
fied. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding Califor-
nia's statutory rape law, which held only men criminally liable); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding Alabama law excluding women from
employment as prison guards in all-male maximum security prison housing sex of-
fenders because their "very womanhood" made them unsuitable for a job that re-
quired employees who could not be heterosexually raped); AFSCME v. Washington,
770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (Title VII not violated by state basing its pay scales on
competitive market rather than comparable worth theories, thereby resulting in low
wage rates for jobs in such female employment ghettoes as administration, person-
nel, and secretarial services).
79. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78-79.
80. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-28, at 1573.
81. The Court in Rostker drastically departed from its analysis of just two years
prior in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), which struck down a state rule against im-
posing alimony obligations on women. In Orr the Court warned that gender classifi-
cations "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing [gender] stereotypes about the 'proper
place' of women and their need for special protection." IdL at 283. The legislative
history of the male-only registration law is riddled with sex-role stereotypes disap-
proved of in Orr, Congress expressed deep concern over "unpredictable reactions to
the fact of female conscription" and the "broader implications" of "a young father
remaining home with the family in a time of national emergency." S. REP. No. 96-
826, at 159 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2612,2649.
82. See supra text accompanying note 2.
83. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding facially
gender-neutral law providing lifetime preference to veterans that overwhelmingly
benefits males); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding federal stat-
ute granting female Navy officers longer tenure before mandatory discharge). But
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male and female officers if the purpose of such treatment is to
compensate for past discrimination or for lack of opportunity for
women.' 4 In Schlesinger v. Ballard"5 a federal statute was upheld
granting female Navy officers a thirteen-year tenure of commis-
sioned service before mandatory discharge upon failure to be se-
lected for promotion, while their male counterparts were provided
only a nine-year tenure.6 The Court recognized that because
women were barred from combat duty, they had fewer opportuni-
ties for promotion than male officers." By allowing women an
additional four years to reach a particular rank before being sub-
ject to mandatory discharge, the Court held that the statute di-
rectly compensated women for statutory barriers to advance-
ment.
Four years later in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,89 the
Court upheld a veterans' preference statute that overwhelmingly
advantaged males."' As previously discussed,9 the gender-neutral
statute in Feeney was challenged by a nonveteran female who al-
leged that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against
women because of its "devastating impact upon the employment
opportunities of women." 92 Regardless of the preference's unfair
impact, the Court concluded that the law does not intentionally
discriminate on the basis of sex; rather the law is a preference for
veterans over nonveterans. 93
In summary, over the past thirty years the Court has shifted
the level of scrutiny in cases involving gender classifications from
rational basis to a stricter application of intermediate scrutiny.94
see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (using strict scrutiny to strike down
military benefits scheme that more heavily burdened female members of uniformed
services when claiming a spouse as a dependent).
84. See Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508.
85. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
86. See ia at 499-500, 510.
87. See id. at 508.
8& See id. at 500. The primary barriers addressed in Schlesinger involved statu-
tory restrictions on women officers' participation in combat and in most sea duty.
See id& at 508. Just as Rostker is ripe for reversal, so is Schlesinger for its outdated
notion of women's involvement in the military. See discussion infra Part VI.
89. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
90. See id. at 259, 281. This litigation commenced in Massachusetts where 98%
of the veterans were male and over 25% of the state's population were veterans. See
id. at 270.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
92. Feeney, 442 U..S. at 260.
93. See id at 280.
94. See supra Part II; see also Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 468
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While the Court has chosen not to treat gender as an inherently
suspect classification, 95 the Court does require an exceedingly per-
suasive justification to uphold the discrimination. 96 Applying this
analysis to single-sex educational institutions, the Court seeks to
eradicate gender stereotypes, whether male or female.9' Despite
the Court's position against perpetuating sex role stereotypes, an
exception is made in cases involving military affairs in which Con-
gress is granted substantial deference.98 Similarly, the Court gen-
erally upholds laws governing noncombat aspects of the military
that have a discriminatory impact in favor of men or that compen-
sate women for past discrimination.99
IV. THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE: THE INTERSECTION OF
EDUCATIONAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS
The diverging lines of equal protection cases in education and
the military create a clash in jurisprudential approaches: what
happens when a constitutional challenge is raised against a single-
sex educational institution that trains, at least in part, for the mili-
tary? This was the challenge raised by the United States against
VMI. Should the Court require women's admission by applying a
stricter application of intermediate scrutiny as it has in education
cases? Or should the Court accord deference to Virginia and
maintain the sanctity and history of VMI as an all-male military in-
stitute?
The following chronicle of the lower court decisions reveals
the tension and confusion in grappling with sex differences and sex
discrimination in educational institutions."' This tension is further
heightened by the unusual character of VMI as a public military
institution."1
(1981) ("[T]he traditional minimum rationality test takes on a somewhat 'sharper
focus' when gender-based classifications are challenged.").
95. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. But see note 67 and accompa-
nying text (questioning whether gender is a suspect classification).
96. See supra Part II.B.
97. See supra Part III.A.
98. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
100. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and
remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Virginia Military Inst.
v. United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993), on remand, United States v. Virginia, 852 F.
Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd and remanded, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), reh'g
en banc denied, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996).
101. While sex-discrimination by the government is no longer a widespread prob-
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Through the lens of feminist theory, the following analysis fo-
cuses on the courts' treatment of gender differences, both physical
and otherwise. These varied approaches set the stage for Justice
Ginsburg to enunciate a new test for gender scrutiny.
A. The District Court Decided in Favor of VMP Applying the
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan Test
In 1990 the United States sued the Commonwealth of Virginia
and VMI alleging that the institution's refusal to admit women
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 03 A complaint filed with the Attorney General by a female
high school student seeking admission to VMI prompted the suit.
1 4
The impetus for bringing suit against VMI was that Virginia
"elected to preserve exclusively for men the advantages and op-
portunities a VMI education affords."105
1. VMI's unique mission and method
At the time of filing the suit, VMI remained the sole single-sex
school among Virginia's fifteen public universities."' Founded in
1839, VMI attributed the sacredness of its single-sex educational
experience to its unique mission and method.'0 VMI's mission was
unlike other federal service academies, such as West Point, that
"prepare cadets for career service in the armed forces." ' 8 VMI's
lem, this Note addresses two areas that retain vestiges of exclusive male privilege:
military-style education and the military draft.
102. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-76.
103. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408.
104. See id
105. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
106. See id. Most of Virginia's public colleges were established as single-sex insti-
tutions. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1418. Four of the 15 public
colleges that were originally all-female institutions became coeducational by 1972.
See id at 1418-19.
In contrast to the voluntary coeducation movement in Virginia's women's
colleges, women were admitted to the all-male University of Virginia only after its
single-sex policy was attacked in court. See id at 1419; see also Kirstein v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (holding that Univer-
sity of Virginia's all-male admissions policy violated equal protection).
In the private sector, Virginia has five all-female colleges and one all-male
college. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1420. The district court found
that "It]he demand for single sex education is substantially greater among women
than among men" and that the private sector is providing for that form of education.
Ld.
107. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2270.
108. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1432.
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unique program was "directed at preparation for both military and
civilian life. ' O'1 VMI achieved its mission through an "adversative
method" of training designed to instill both physical and mental
discipline in its cadets and to impart in them a strong moral code.1
VMI's method:
"emphasizes physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equal-
ity of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of
behavior, and indoctrination of values." ...
VMI's adversative method is implemented through a
pervasive military-style system .... includ[ing] the "rat
line," which is a seven-month regimen during which first-
year cadets, or "rats," are "treated miserably," ....
"Rats" are subjected to a strict system of punishments
and rewards that creates "a sense of accomplishment and
a bonding to their fellow sufferers and former tormen-
tors."'
VMI's strenuous training has produced "military generals, Mem-,,112 adpw
bers of Congress, and business executives. This loyal and pow-
erful alumni network is "'enormously influential,' especially in the
male-dominated fields of engineering, the military, business, and
public service."1
3
2. VMI's all-male admissions policy upheld under the guise of
diversity
The United States asserted that "as a state-supported college,
VMI's refusal to admit females ... regardless of their qualifica-
tions, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'1 4  In this "life-and-death confrontation,""15 VMI
successfully defended its all-male admission policy "by saying that
although it discriminates against women, the discrimination is not
invidious but rather [it] promote[s] a legitimate state interest-
diversity in education.""
Following the single-sex education model of intermediate
109. Id.
110. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
111. Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (No. 94-
1941) (citations omitted).
112. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
113. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Virginia (No. 94-1941).
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scrutiny,17 the district court used the test in Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan,"8 which requires that "[t]he party seeking to
uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their
gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly persua-
sive justification for the classification." Pursuant to Hogan, the
district court equated the exceedingly persuasive standard with the
important governmental interest standard. The court reasoned
that single-gender education at VMI was an important governmen-
tal objective that could only be achieved by excluding women from
the all-male institution: "[VMI's] single-sex status would be lost,
and some aspects of the distinctive method would be altered if it
were to admit women."' 20 Ironically, the same test that required
Mississippi University for Women's all-female nursing program to
admit men was used by the district court to uphold the exclusion of
women from VMI.
3. The backlash of sex difference theories
The court justified its denial of opportunity for women by us-
ing a combination of "difference" arguments, including physical,
social, and psychological differences among the sexes. 2  While
physical differences are less controversial, arguments regarding
social and psychological differences are more controversial.'
Even if we accept these differences as real, how courts choose to
respond to them is controversial among feminist theorists. 2J
117. See supra Part III.A.
118. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
119. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1410 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at
724); see supra Part II.B.
120. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1413.
121. See id at 1432-34.
122. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1279 (1987), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 35, 35-36 (Katharine T.
Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (describing two approaches courts take in
responding to gender differences: (1) the "symmetrical" approach, which treats sex
like race by denying that there are any significant natural differences between men
and women; and (2) the "asymmetrical" approach, which rejects the notion that all
gender differences should disappear and advocates any sexually equal society must
somehow deal with these differences); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference and
Dominance on Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW (1987), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 81, 81 (Katharine T. Bartlett
& Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) ("A built-in tension exists between this concept of
equality, which presupposes sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes
difference. Sex equality thus becomes a contradiction in terms, something of an
oxymoron, which may suggest why we are having such a difficult time getting it.").
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a. gender-based physical differences
The court's findings of fact included a three-page list enumer-
ating the physical differences between men and women.'24 The
court emphasized that these differences are real and not stereo-
typical.' 5 Not surprisingly, the court found that men are stronger
than women; 26 women cannot perform push-ups, pull-ups, and
weight lifting at the same level as men.' 27 The court also found that
women were slower,'2 fatter, 29 and more prone to injury.130 How-
ever, the district court failed to acknowledge that these conclu-
sions regarding physical differences are skewed since they account
for college averages and not averages of those men and potential
women applying to VMI.
b. gender-based psychological differences
Gender difference theories, spawned by Carol Giligan's In a
Different Voice,131 were intended to recognize and celebrate the
psychological differences of women from men;3 2 namely, that
124. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1432-34.
125. See id. at 1432.
126. See id. ("Even when size is held constant, females are, on the average, only
80% as strong as males.").
127. See id. at 1433.
128. See id. at 1432 ("The speed of movement in women is, on the average, slower
than in men.").
129. See id. at 1433 ("On the average, college-age females possess approximately
10% more body fat than college-age males. Body fat imposes a burden on some
kinds of physical performance.").
130. See id. ("Median college-age females tend to sustain injury up to eight times
the rate of median college-age males when engaged in the same or similar physical
activities.").
131. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1982).
132. See id. Gilligan theorizes that as a result of differences in moral development
between young boys and girls, men and women speak in different "voices." See id. at
1. Women view their world through a web of relationships sustained by an "ideal of
care," while men operate in a world of individualism and hierarchy. See id. at 62.
Gilligan is one of the most widely quoted and influential feminists of the 1980s
whose work is cited in many psychology papers, legal briefs, and public policy pro-
posals. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WOMEN 327 (1991).
Faludi documents the 1980s antifeminist backlash, which holds the feminist
movement responsible for nearly every woe besetting women, including depression,
suicide, eating disorders, "bag ladies," crime, and rape. See id. at xi-xii. Faludi also
dispels the myth that women have "made it": 80% of women are stuck in traditional
"female" jobs, 99% of employers do not offer child care programs, new laws restrict-
ing abortion have been passed, and women still shoulder 70% of the household du-
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women's psychological development makes them more caring and
cooperative.13 1 Since Gilligan's ground-breaking work, her theo-
ries have infiltrated mainstream America as a means of recogniz-
ing the importance of women's feminine contributions to society."
However, Gilligan's theories have been used by others to bolster
their arguments that independence is an unnatural and unhealthy
state for women and that women pay a "psychic price" for profes-
sional success.1 35 Gilligan deplores the use of her work on sex dif-
ferences to rationalize oppression, but the backlash has already
taken hold.
136
While the district court did not cite Gilligan as a basis for its
decision, her theories of difference are apparent in the court's
opinion. In its discussion of gender-based developmental differ-
ences, the court found:
Given these developmental differences females and
males characteristically learn differently. Males tend to
need an atmosphere of adversativeness or ritual combat
in which the teacher is a disciplinarian and a worthy com-
petitor. Females tend to thrive in a cooperative atmos-
phere in which the teacher is emotionally connected with
the students.1 37
The court's reasoning exemplifies the current backlash of Gilli-
gan's sex difference theories to oppress women by preventing their
success in traditionally male-dominated environments. To give
credence to its own conclusions, the court found that "[t]he psy-
chological and sociological differences between men and women
ties. See id. at xiii-xiv.
For a discussion of Gilligan's influence on feminist theory, see id. at 327.
Translating Gilligan's work into a legal framework, the paradigm is one of rights ver-
sus responsibilities. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1988). Rights represent the autonomy of the male voice while responsibilities rep-
resent the "ethic of care" and connectedness of the female voice. See id. at 18.
133. See GILLIGAN, supra note 131, at 10-11.
134. See, e.g., Janet Wiscombe, In Full Bloom, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at El.
The author profiles Judy Rosener, management professor at the University of Cali-
fornia at Irvine, known for her theories on gender differences in business. Rosener
argues that "women thrive in non-hierarchical ways and prefer cooperative, shared
leadership; men are more inclined toward styles of 'command and control."' Id. She
further states that "Both are good... I'm saying we've got to utilize the skills of pro-
fessional women. It's not just a social justice issue. It's an economic imperative." Id.
135. See FALUDI, supra note 132, at 331 ("Very much against her will, Gilligan be-
came the expert that backlash mass media loved to cite.").
136. See id.
137. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1434.
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are real differences, not stereotypes."'3
The United States' expert tried to minimize the absoluteness
of these conclusions by describing sex differences as mere
"tendencies."'3 9 Hence, even if we accept these conclusions as ac-
curate, these "attributes of males and females in individual cases
may diverge from these average tendencies."'"' By failing to dis-
tinguish between exceptional women who would thrive under the
adversative method and the stereotypical mass of women, the dis-
trict court concluded that VMI is unsuitable for all women.
4. VMI unmodified
The court ruled that if VMI was coeducational, the adversa-
tive environment could not survive unaltered.4  Such modifica-
tions considered by the court included an "[a]llowance for per-
sonal privacy ' ' a change, "at least for the women," in the
physical education requirements.' 43 While the district court rec-
ognized that some women could meet all the physical standards
imposed on men,'44 its fundamental problem was with mixed-
gender education at VMIl.'
In addition to the conclusion that accommodations would
have to be made to the physical fitness curriculum, the court was
also concerned with the effect women would have in the class-
room.146  VMI's expert speculated that women may demand
changes such as different reading in literature courses.47 With
such speculation, the court manipulated gender differences to jus-
tify excluding women.
In short, it is undisputed that admitting women would repre-
sent a "dramatic clientele change."'"' Such a change would neces-
sitate a modification of the institutional experience in order to at-
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1412-13.
142. Id. at 1412.
143. Id. at 1413.
144. See id. at 1412; United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896.
145. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1414 ("Ironically, although
much of the testimony at trial concerned the ways that men and women are different,
my ruling is based on a trait that men and women share: Both men and women can
benefit from a single-sex education.").
146. See id at 1441.
147. See id.
148. Id at 1436.
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tract and maintain female students.1 49 A change in the educational
experience may even include a change to VMrs sacrosanct mis-
sion. Virginia convinced the court that VMI is indeed different
because it "marches to the beat of a different drummer" and that
any change to VMI would obliterate VMI.1
5'
B. The Fourth Circuit Decided to Remand: Applying the
Traditional Governmental Objective Test
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals employed the traditional
important governmental objective test of Craig v. Boren" and did
not require Virginia to show an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion for women's exclusion. The court cited Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 3 but interpreted the Hogan test to require
only that the "statutory classification must be substantially related
to an important governmental objective."'- The court agreed that
diversity was an important governmental objective, but questioned
whether women's exclusion was substantially related to that ob-
jective. 55 Thus, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the dis-
trict court's decision for failing to explain how maintenance of one
single-gender institution in the state effectuated the governmental
objective of diversity.5
The decisive question for the court was why the Common-
wealth of Virginia offered this opportunity only to men.' The
court identified the catch-22 of the conflict: "women are denied
the opportunity when excluded from VMI and cannot be given the
opportunity by admitting them, because the change caused by their
admission would destroy the opportunity. '  The opportunity
would be destroyed because the physiological differences between
men and women would necessarily require changes in the physical
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id at 1415.
152. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
153. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
154. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1992).
155. See id. at 895.
156. See id. at 892. Although the Fourth Circuit did not employ the exceedingly
persuasive justification test, its decision is not inconsistent with the holding of
Hogan, which provided that its test could be met by "at least" showing that the clas-
sification serves important governmental objectives. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. Thus,
VMI failed to meet this threshold showing.
157. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 898.
158. Id. at 896-97.
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training program and physical accommodations to allow for pri-
vacy between the sexes. 59 While real gender differences precluded
requiring coeducation at VMI,' 60 the court provided the Common-
wealth with three options: (1) "admit women to VMI and adjust
the program to implement that choice"; 61 (2) "establish parallel in-
stitutions or parallel programs"; 62 or (3) "abandon state support of
VIMI., 163
C. The District Court Decision on Remand: Comparable-Outcome
Education Satisfies Constitutional Notions of Equality
After the Supreme Court denied Virginia's application for
certiorari, 64 the only issue on remand to the district court was
whether the remedial plan chosen by Virginia comported with the
constitutional mandates of equal protection.' 6 Virginia's remedial
plan was to establish a separate all-female college program-
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL)-at Mary
Baldwin College.'66 In evaluating this plan, the court did not ad-
here to the prongs of intermediate scrutiny; rather, the court based
its decision on philosophical notions of equality. The different ap-
proaches toward equality advocated by the United States and
Virginia represent the paradigmatic differences in the treatment of
gender under equal protection: sameness versus difference. 67
The United States advocated an equality of sameness philoso-
phy in rejecting VWIL as an appropriate remedy.' 6 The United
States argued that VWIL did not comply with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because in lieu of coeducation at VMI, VWIL did not
adequately resemble the physical structure, curriculum, methodol-
159. See id. at 896.
160. See id. at 895 ("[N]o one suggests that equal protection of the laws requires
that all laws apply to all persons without regard to actual differences.").
161. Id. at 900.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993).
165. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 474 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd
and remanded, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996).
166. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 476.
167. For a discussion of liberal feminism's sameness approach of denying the dif-
ferences between men and women, see ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT 27
(1989).
168. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 475.
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ogy, or prestige of VMI.'69 In using a sameness approach to gen-
der, the United States sought to treat sex like race, that there is no
natural difference between men and women.17
By refusing to construe VWIL as a "separate but equal" insti-
tution for women, the district court decided in favor of Virginia.171
Instead of focusing on the similarities of the sexes, the district
court focused on the "real differences between the sexes. '1 2 Ironi-
cally, the court concluded that while separate but equal institutions
are not acceptable for racial discrimination, a separate and une-
qual institution is acceptable for gender discrimination. 7 3
While there were similarities between VMI and VWIL, the
differences were more pronounced. VWIL matched VMI as a
single-sex, publicly funded, residential four-year college, with the
mission to produce "citizen-soldiers": "women who are trained for
leadership in both civilian and military life."1 74 VMI also pledged
to make its alumni network and placement service available to
VWIL graduates. 75
Although these general attributes mirrored each other, VMI
and VWIL greatly differed in their methods of education, aca-
demic offerings, and financial resources.1 76  For example, VWIL
women were not required to wear uniforms during the school day,
nor were they required to eat together.1 7 VWIL women took self-
defense courses instead of boxing.178  VMI had group showers,
169. See id.
170. Christine Littleton refers to this sameness model as a "symmetrical" ap-
proach to gender. See Littleton, supra note 123, at 35-36.
171. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 475.
172. Id. at 476 (quoting Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993)). The
district court justified its decision in upholding VWIL as a separate and different in-
stitution for women by using the language in Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th
Cir. 1993), which affirmed a preliminary injunction admitting female Shannon
Faulkner to day classes at The Citadel, an all-male South Carolina military college.
The court stated, "When, however, a gender classification is justified by acknowl-
edged differences, identical facilities are not necessarily mandated." Id. at 232.
173. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 475 (discussing Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)).
174. Id. at 476. VWIL's mission is "to produce 'citizen-soldiers who are educated
and honorable women, prepared for the varied work of civil life, qualified to serve in
the armed forces, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and atti-
tudes of leadership, and possessing a high sense of public service."' Id. at 494.
175. See id. at 499.
176. See id. at 477-81.
177. See id. at 495.
178. See id.
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while VWIL had private showers.179 VMI barracks had doors with
windows that remain unlocked, while VWIL residential rooms had
solid doors that lock."' VWIL faculty held significantly fewer
Ph.D.'s than the VMI faculty.181 VWIL did not offer a bachelor of
science degree nor offer engineering on campus; instead, VWIL
women who wished to earn an engineering degree were required
to travel to Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri to obtain
it.1 2 Finally, VWIL had an endowment of approximately $19 mil-
lion, while VMI's was $131 million.1 3
These differences gave rise to the question of whether equal
protection mandates carbon-copy institutions or only a suitable al-
ternative, taking into consideration women's differences. In de-
veloping a VMI-style program suitable for women, Virginia
formed a task force that consulted with outside experts who testi-
fied at the first hearing in support of a Gilliganesque approach to
gender-based psychological differences.1 Drawing on their own
experience and expertise, the task force decided that a military
model, particularly VMI's adversative method, would be "wholly
inappropriate for educating and training most women for leader-
ship roles."1
The task force failed to recognize that VMI would not attract
"most" women.1m Instead, it chose to institute "a cooperative
method which reinforces self-esteem rather than the leveling proc-
ess used by VMI." 7 The experts believed, however, that despite
the vastly different teaching methods, VWIL would "produce the
179. See id. at 502.
180. See icL
181. See id. ("While 86% of VMI's faculty holds Ph.D.'s, 68% of [VWIL's] faculty
hold such degrees.").
182. See id. at 503.
183. See id
184. See iL; see also supra Part IV.A.3.b (discussing Carol Gilligan's theories of
women's psychological development making women more caring and cooperative
than men).
185. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 476 (emphasis added).
186. See id However, the district court considered the testimony of government
expert Dr. Carol Nagy Jacklin that "the plan homogenizes women by assuming that
there is an appropriate way to educate women." Id at 479. Dr. Jacklin testified that
"[g]ender is not a useful predictor of learning patterns." Id. In this battle of the ex-
perts, Dr. Jacklin lost. The court fell prey to two sweeping generalizations: (1)
women are passive in the classroom as opposed to men who are interactive; and (2)
single-sex institutions provide women with more chances for leadership. See id. at
480.
187. Id at 476.
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same or similar outcome for women that VMI produces for
men." '188 But the difference was starkly manifest in the differing
nomenclature; VMI men were referred to as "cadets," while
VWIL women were generically referred to as "students."'8 9 These
labels exacerbated the inequity between the institutions and sig-
nificantly impacted the self-perception of VWIL women."' Simply
put, these differing institutions perpetuated gender stereotypes in
producing citizen-soldiers; VMI trained the soldier, while VWIL
trained the citizen.191
D. The Fourth Circuit Affirms VWIL as an Appropriate Remedy
Under a "Special Intermediate Scrutiny Test"
A divided court of appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion that the VWIL plan passed constitutional muster.'1 Not sur-
prisingly, the same court that suggested a parallel institution and
program also decided to uphold its establishment.'93 The circuit
court rejected the United States' position that "by not offering co-
education at VMI, [Virginia] is relying on false stereotypes and
generalizations 'that women are not tough enough to succeed in
VMI's rigorous, military-style program.""' Instead, the court
found that the Equal Protection Clause required only a
"substantively comparable" alternative.'
In arriving at its conclusion, the court applied a "special in-
termediate scrutiny test."' This new test incorporated an addi-
tional prong into the old test:'9 "whether the resulting mutual ex-
188. Id.
189. See id. at 483.
190. See HAi A. BOSMAJIAN, THE LANGUAGE OF OPPREsSION 5 (1974) ("The
power which comes from names and naming is related directly to the power to define
others-individuals, races, sexes, ethnic groups. Our identities, who and what we
are, how others see us, are greatly affected by the names we are called and the words
with which we are labelled.").
191. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 478 ("VWIL, because it is
planned for women who do not necessarily expect to pursue military careers, incor-
porates the element of public service.").
192. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995) (2-1 decision),
rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
193. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1242.
194. Id. at 1235.
195. Id. at 1237.
196. Id.
197. See id. ("(1) whether the state's objective of providing single-gender educa-
tion to its citizens may be considered a legitimate and important governmental ob-
jective; (2) whether the gender classification adopted is directly and substantially re-
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clusion of women and men from each other's institutions leaves
open opportunities for those excluded to obtain substantively com-
parable benefits at their institution or through other means offered
by the state." '198
The circuit court applied "procedural equal protection"
analysis, focusing on the state's means for obtaining its objective!"
Under this analysis, a court closely scrutinizes the procedural
mechanism adopted by the legislature to accomplish its purpose
and requires that the means selected bear a "direct and substantial
relationship" to that purpose.2° In applying procedural equal pro-
tection analysis to the case at hand, the first two prongs of the
special intermediate scrutiny test were easily passed. 2' Under the
first prong, deference was accorded to the state's purpose of pro-
viding single-gender education. 2
The focus of this procedural analysis was on the second prong:
the means. The court conceded that the second prong provides
little or no scrutiny in cases involving homogeneity of gender be-
cause the exclusion of one sex is by definition necessary for ac-
complishing the objective.0 3 The court missed the point when it
stated that "[t]he importance of the classification is not the fact
that the student body is male or female, but that it is of the same
gender, whichever is chosen for the particular program."2°4
In Machiavellian style, the circuit court concluded that the
means directly relate to the ends: the adversative method cannot
be tolerated in a sexually heterogeneous environment because it
"would destroy ... any sense of decency that still permeates the
lated to that purpose."); see also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's adoption of intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976)).
198. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1237 (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1236.
201. The court concluded that the classification was not directed at men or
women-but at homogeneity of gender. See id. at 1237.
202. See id& ("[D]eference is to be accorded the state's legislative will so long as
the purpose is not pernicious and does not violate traditional notions of the role of
government.") But see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("I[T]he
mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme."); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-14 (1977) (inquiring into the ac-
tual purposes of a Social Security Act provision that automatically granted benefits
to a wife but provided benefits to surviving husband only if he received at least half
of his support from his deceased wife).
203. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1237.
204. Id. at 1239.
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relationship between the sexes."2 5 In justifying the unsuitability of
women in an adversative environment, the court stated that "[t]he
adversative method was not designed to exclude women";2°6 the
method only seized on the male need for aggressiveness, conflict,
lack of privacy, and stress in order to instill in men the values of
VMI.2 1 The court failed to recognize its own double-standard-if
the adversative method was not designed to exclude women, why
not include women? Alternatively, why not institute the adversa-
tive method at VWIL, as opposed to the nurturing, caring envi-
ronment espoused by the task force?
The court recognized the pitfall in applying its two-prong test
of intermediate scrutiny for cases involving homogeneity of gen-
der; the classification easily passes the test unless found to be per-
nicious or incompatible with traditional notions of equal protec-
tion. Hence, the court found it necessary to add another prong to
the inquiry: substantive comparability. 28 The court defined this
prong to require only that "the value of the benefits provided by
the state to one gender" may not "by comparison to the benefits
provided to the other.., lessen the dignity, respect, or societal re-
gard of the other gender."
The court unequivocally stated that comparable does not
mean identical.21" Rather, the alternative must be "comparable in
substance, but not in form and detail., 21' The court concluded that
substantive comparability was achieved because VMI and VWIL
were both undergraduate institutions that have similar missions to
teach discipline and identical goals of preparing students for lead-
ership. Although the mechanisms for achieving those goals dif-
ferred-VMI used an adversative military method, and VWIL
used a structured environment reinforced by some military train-
ing-the scheme passed constitutional muster because, the circuit
court argued, men and women are different. 23 Thus, when real
gender differences are involved, separate and different facilities




208. See id. at 1237.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 1240.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 1240-41.
213. See id.
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in facilities is sufficiently related to the nature of the difference be-
tween the sexes.
214
The majority failed to require Virginia to make an
"'exceedingly persuasive"' showing that the gender-classification is
"'substantially and directly related"' to the remedial plan as re-
quired in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.2" Rather,
the court cleverly clothed a rational basis standard of review under
the guise of this special test. So long as the first two hurdles are
met,211 comparable opportunity will be gauged by deference to pro-? .. 217
fessional judgment.
E. The Dissent to the Fourth Circuit's Denial to Rehear the Case
En Banc: Judge Motz's Response to the Varied Approaches to
Equal Protection
Although a majority of the Fourth Circuit voted against re-
hearing the case en banc, Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote a dis-
senting opinion that attacked the disjointed approaches to equal
protection of the district court and court of appeals.218
Judge Motz first attacked the notions of equality standard put
forth by the district court on remand and accepted in the Fourth
Circuit's decision on review. 219 She argued that the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision effectively upholds "separate but equal" education
for men and women that is "concededly not even equal.'"M She fur-
ther noted that "'these cases have very little to do with education.
They instead have very much to do with wealth, power, and the
ability of those who have it now to determine who will have it
later."' , 1
214. See id.
215. Id. at 1248 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724,730 (1982)).
216. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
217. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1241 ("[T]he difference [between
VMI and VWIL] is attributable to a professional judgment of how best to provide
the same opportunity."). The question of whose professional judgment will control
remains unanswered. In this case, the court relied on Virginia's educational experts
who testified that a VMI-type education was unsuitable for and unappealing to
women. See id. The plaintiff failed to satisfy its heavy burden of proving that "the
Commonwealth's expert testimony was clearly erroneous." Id. (emphasis added).
218. See United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
219. See supra Part IV.C.
220. United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d at 91.
221. Id. at 92 n.3 (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440,
451 (4th Cir. 1995) (Hall, J., concurring), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995)).
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Under the Hogan test, Judge Motz argued that Virginia failed
to show an exceedinglL persuasive justification for VMI's male-
only admissions policy. She pointed out that other coeducational
military academies graduate far more citizen-soldiers than VMI.
213
Thus, there was no direct and substantial relationship between
VMI's objective of producig citizen-soldiers and the means em-
ployed of excluding 
women.
Lastly, Judge Motz criticized the Fourth Circuit's special in-
termediate scrutiny test. She maintained that even if the lower
court's substantive comparability analysis was accepted as a valid
part of intermediate scrutiny, the analysis was fatally flawed: "If
'adversative' training is so critical to the VMI program that it vir-
tually defines it, then a program without 'adversative' training can
never be 'substantively comparable."' m Judge Motz passionately
concluded:
Several months ago, one of the first women fighter pilots
was killed during a practice run. Anyone who is prepared
to do combat for her country-indeed, to be killed in
preparation for that combat-should be eligible to apply
for what she perceives to be the best possible training. As
long as the Commonwealth provides support for VMI,
women should be given the opportunity to attend. 6
The United States Supreme Court agreed.27
F. Certiorari Granted by the United States Supreme Court: Justice
Ginsburg Applied "Skeptical Scrutiny"
In a 7-1 decision, VMI's all-male admissions policy was de-
clared unconstitutional.22 Considering the divided nature of the
Court's recent opinions, this near-unanimity in a ground-breaking
case is remarkable229
222. See id. at 92 (Motz, J., dissenting).
223. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
224. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 93 (Motz, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 93-94 (Motz, J., dissenting).
227. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
228. See id. at 2269. Justice Antonin Scalia was the lone dissenter. See id. at 2291.
229. Justice Clarence Thomas did not participate in the decision because his son
attends VMI. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Confusion from the High Court, CONN. L.
TRIB., July 15, 1996, at 9.
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1. Justice Ginsburg continues her "incremental approach"
Justice Ginsburg was the natural choice for writing the opin-
ion. As an attorney she built her reputation as the preeminent liti-
gator in gender equality litigation with the ACLU and its
Women's Rights Project.230 Most notably, she assisted in preparing
the brief for Reed v. Reed,'3' which successfully persuaded the
Court to declare a state law unconstitutional because of gender
discrimination. 32 She also helped pave the way for future cases by
suggesting that gender-like race-be subjected to strict scru-
tiny.
233
Although Justice Ginsburg advocated for strict scrutiny for
gender classifications, she did not expect the Court to adopt this
standard when she prepared the brief for Reed; rather, she hoped
that after presenting the idea over a period of time, a body of
precedent would be established making it possible for the Court to
later adopt this higher standard of review. 4 Following the Reed
victory, Ginsburg successfully argued numerous gender discrimi-
nation cases before the Supreme Court.235 She called her strategy
the "incremental approach,"'26  in which she would build
"'precedents one upon the other.""'37 In Frontiero v. Richardson
she succeeded in persuading four Justices that strict scrutiny
should be applied to gender discrimination.238 However, in order
to garner majority support, she was required to modify her ap-
proach. Thus, she pressed the Court to adopt intermediate scru-
tiny, culminating with success in Craig v. Boren.239
Once on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg's
background as the nation's most influential litigator on gender
equality raised expectations of her impact in areas of interest to
230. See Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 24-25.
231. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
232. See Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 25. For a discussion of Reed, see supra Part
II.
233. See Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 25.
234. See id. at 25 n.197.
235. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975).
236. Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 25.
237. Id. (citing Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's
Work to Change the Law, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 73, 83 (1989)).
238. See id at 26.
239. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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women's rights advocates. 24° In her first year on the bench, Justice
Ginsburg supported the outcomes favored by women's rights ad-
vocates but did not seize opportunities to expand on women's
rights.242 While she did not author any majority opinions on gender
equality during her first term, her short concurring opinion in
Harris v. Forklift Systems243 contains a key footnote that raises a
significant issue for future constitutional cases and for Justice
Ginsburg's role on the Court: whether gender classifications are
inherently suspect.244 This footnote appears to be an example of
Justice Ginsburg's incremental approach 5 in which she laid the
foundation for questioning the appropriate standard of review. It
was only a matter of time before the issue reappeared in the
Court's opinions. While it was suggested that this footnote might
ultimately provide the basis for Justice Ginsburg's much-
anticipated liberal change to provide greater protection against
gender discrimination,246 no one predicted her "skeptical scrutiny"approach.
2. Virginia failed the Hogan test of intermediate scrutiny
While the Solicitor General urged the Court to adopt strict
scrutiny for gender-based classifications, the Court declined the
240. See Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 26.
241. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (creating
buffer zones around abortion clinics to permit patients to have access without undue
interference by protesters); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)
(prohibiting systematic gender-based application of peremptory challenges to jurors
during voir dire); National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)
(granting standing to health care clinics to apply racketeering statutes against a coa-
lition of antiabortion groups that conspired to shut down abortion clinics through
extortion).
242. See Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 27. "[S]he was never an advocate of
women's rights per se. She was literally an advocate of gender equality .... '[Justice]
Ginsburg's symmetrical vision of sex equality came under bitter attack by a new gen-
eration of feminist legal scholars who argued that the law should emphasize women's
differences with men, rather than their similarities."' Id. at 28 (quoting Rosen, supra
note 7, at 20).
243. 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (unanimous court declared that plaintiffs alleging sexual
harassment in the workplace need not prove psychological harm to state a valid
claim); see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
244. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 26 n.* (unnumbered footnote in original) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring); see also Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 28 ("The use of a footnote may
seem an odd way to send a signal about the possible pursuit of a major change in
constitutional doctrine, but a footnote may ultimately provide the basis for signifi-
cant legal change.").
245. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
246. See Baugh et al., supra note 5, at 29.
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invitation.247 In evaluating the United States' equal protection
claim, the Court relied on Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan and required Virginia to show an "'exceedingly persua-
sive justification"' for excluding women.249 The Court concluded
that Virginia did not meet its burden, thereby violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.O Moreover,
the Court concluded that VWIL did not cure the constitutional
violation.25l
The Court rejected Virginia's two justifications for its classifi-
cation: diversity in educational approaches and the unique VMI
method. 2 In evaluating these justifications the Court rejected the
deferential approach of the Fourth Circuit.253 Instead, the Court
advocated a "'searching analysis"'-far beyond the articulated
justification or rationalization-but for the actual purpose.2 This
searching analysis looked beyond the conflict at hand, and delved
into the history of education in the state as a whole.2S
Looking at the history of diversity in public education in Vir-
ginia, the Court noted Virginia's long and bitter history of not
admitting women at the university level.26 The Court concluded
that Virginia did not have a history of evenhanded advancement of
diverse educational options.Z Thus, the Court rejected diversity
247. See Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 9.
248. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
249. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
250. See id. at 2276.
251. See id.
252. See id. The Court specifically limited its decision to educational opportuni-
ties that are "unique," not a sweeping abolition of all public single-sex educational
institutions. See id. at 2276 n.7. But see id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The
Court's decision] ensures that single-sex public education is functionally dead.").
253. See id. at 2275 ("Without equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to
classifications based on race or national origin, the Court, in post-Reed decisions, has
carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women
(or to men)." (footnote omitted))
254. Id. at 2277 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728).
255. See id. at 2277-78.
256. See id. at 2277 ("'[N]o struggle for the admission of women to a state univer-
sity' ... 'was longer drawn out, or developed more bitterness, than that at the Uni-
versity of Virginia."' (citing 2 THOMAS WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDU-
CATION IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (1929)). Virginia's most prestigious university,
the University of Virginia, did not admit women until 1972. See id. at 2278.
257. While Virginia had repealed all statutes requiring individual institutions to
admit only men or women, there was only one statement in the record that Virginia
held itself as evenhanded: "'Because colleges and universities provide opportunities
for students to develop values and learn from role models, it is extremely important
that they deal with faculty, staff, and students without regard to sex, race, or ethnic
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as a sufficient justification to deny women admission to VMI. 2 8
The Court similarly rejected maintaining VMI's unique char-
acter as a proper justification for women's exclusion.29 The argu-
ment that admitting women would downgrade VMI's stature and
destroy its adversative system was analogized to the outmoded
justifications for denying women admission to the bar and access
to legal education and for denying African-Americans admission
to VMI until 1968.2w The Court conceded that there would be a
period of adjustment26' but that "[e]xperience shows such adjust-
ments are manageable., 262 Women's successful entry into federal
military academies and their participation in the military "indicate
that Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be solidly
grounded."26 So long as some women are qualified to meet the
admission standards of VMI, Virginia cannot show an exceedingly
persuasive justification based on uniqueness.2 4
Furthermore, the Court concluded that Virginia and VMI
misperceived legal precedent by focusing on the "'means' rather
than the 'end."' Virginia argued that the end of single-sex edu-
cation could only be achieved by exclusion.20 The Court corrected
the analysis by stating that the end was to produce citizen-soldiers,
not single-gender education. 27 With citizen-soldiers as its aim, the
cateorical exclusion of women does not substantially advance that
aim.
3. Inherent physical differences between men and women deemed
overbroad generalizations
As an advocate, Justice Ginsburg's ambition "was to purge the
law of sweeping stereotypes that prevent individuals, women and
men, from following their inclinations rather than submitting to
conventional gender roles., 26 9 As a Supreme Court Justice, she
origin."' United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting the 1990
Report of the Virginia Commission on the University of the 21st Century).
258. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 2280, 2282 n.16.
261. See id. at 2281 n.15.
262. Id. at 2284 n.19.




267. See id. at 2281-82.
268. See id. at 2282.
269. Rosen, supra note 7, at 31.
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called upon a Gilliganesque model of gender differences, pointing
out that inherent differences between men and women "remain
cause for celebration," not for denigration2' While inherent dif-
ferences are no longer accepted as a ground for race or national
origin classifications, classifications based on physical differences
between men and women endureY21
Rather than challenging the lower court's expert findings of
average capacities or preferences of men and women, the Court
wisely changed the focal point of inquiry. The Court assumed
these generalizations to be true, but not true for the population as
a whole, viewing them as mere "tendencies" and "overbroad gen-
eralizations., 272 VMI's method of education was never asserted to
be suitable for most men.2 3 Similarly, most women would not
choose to undergo VMI's adversative method.274 Thus, these
findings were, by and large, meaningless. Instead, the Court fo-
cused on those women who did meet the current standards of ad-
mission and asked "whether the State can constitutionally deny to
women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords."
2 75
The Court did not address the specific physical fitness re-
quirements imposed on new recruits. Regardless, requiring
women to perform at the same physical level as men as an admis-
sions prerequisite is questionable since the purpose of VMI is not
to send young men onto the battlefield: "VMI's mission is to pro-
duce educated and honorable men who are suited for leadership in
civilian life and who can provide military leadership when neces-
sary., 276 How relevant is one's percentage of body fat or upper-
body strength in corporate boardrooms or the halls of Congress?2"
270. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276; see also supra notes 132-36 and
accompanying text (discussing Carol Gilligan's theories of sex differences).
271. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
272. Id. at 2280.
273. See id. at 2284.
274. See id. at 2280.
275. Id.
276. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1425 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated
and remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
277. See ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A
CRITIQUE OF INDIVIDUALISM 252 (1991) ("Modern technology ensures that there are
very few occupations that women cannot perform as effectively as men. In what
way, after all, is muscular strength a prerequisite for pushing the button that will un-
leash nuclear warfare? Or for flying a jet bomber?"). In contrast to her prior em-
phasis on androgyny, Dr. Fox-Genovese later focused on sex differences when she
testified that "an adversative method of teaching in an all-female school would be
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4. Striking down the remedial plan as separate and unequal
After concluding that Virginia had not set forth an exceed-
ingly persuasive justification, the Court examined VWIL as a re-
medial plan.2rs The Court rejected VWIL as a comparable institu-
tion and analogized it to the all-white Texas Law School in Sweatt
v. Painter.279 VWIL was described as a "'pale shadow' of VMI in
terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, fund-
ing, prestige, alumni support and influence. '"'  The substantive
comparability test, which the Fourth Circuit used to uphold VWIL
as a remedial measure, was flatly rejected.2s Instead, the Court
required a close fit, such that the remedy would place persons un-
constitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in "'the posi-
tion the would have occupied in the absence of [the discrimina-
tion]."' The Court concluded that separate and unequal
educational programs for men and women did not satisfy the man-
dates of equal protection. Thus, VWIL was not a satisfactory
remedy. Left with only the option to privatize or admit women,
VMI was forced to accept the latter.28
5. "Skeptical scrutiny": The exceedingly persuasive justification
requirement prevails
The majority never explicitly stated that it utilized a trans-
formed version of intermediate scrutiny. Nor did the majority use
the language of "intermediate scrutiny" in referring to its standard
of review. Instead, Justice Ginsburg hinted at a change by dubbing
her approach "skeptical scrutiny," which she summarized as fol-
lows:
Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of oppor-
not only inappropriate for most women, but counter-productive." United States v.
Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd and remanded, 44 F.3d 1229
(4th Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
278. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282.
279. See id. at 2285 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)); see also supra
note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the disparity between the district court's
treatment of sex and race).
280. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2285.
281. See id at 2286 ("The Fourth Circuit displaced the standard developed in our
precedent and substituted a standard of its own invention .... The Fourth Circuit
plainly erred in exposing Virginia's VWIL plan to a deferential analysis ... "
(citations omitted)).
282. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
283. See id. at 2286-87.
284. See infra text accompanying notes 313-14.
285. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
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tunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must
determine whether the proferred justification is
"exceedingly persuasive." The burden of justification is
demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The State
must show "at least that the [challenged] classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives."' The justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.2"
Measuring the facts of VMI against this standard of review, the
Court concluded that Virginia failed to show an "'exceedingly per-
suasive justification' for excluding all women from citizen-soldier
training afforded by VMI. ' '"w
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's concurrence and Justice
Antonin Scalia's dissent lamented what they perceived to be a
sharp turn in the Court's approach to gender discrimination. Chief
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority that VMI's all-male
admissions policy violated equal protection and that the VWIL
program did not remedy that violation.m However he disagreed
with including the exceedingly persuasive justification requirement
to support gender-based classifications.n' Rather, the Chief Jus-
tice sought to avoid potential confusion by adhering to the
"traditional, 'firmly established,"' standard.29, While implying that
the majority adopted a new standard of review, he did not go as far
as Justice Scalia who labeled this new standard as
"indistinguishable from strict scrutiny.,
29'
One reporter noted that Justice Scalia's dissent reads "more
like a sorrowful lament to the passing of the era of male chivalry
than a serious effort to defend taxpayer-funded segregation of men
and women."2 2 Justice Scalia criticized the Court's use of the ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification requirement found in Hogan and
286. Id at 2275 (citations omitted).
287. Id. at 2276.
288. See id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
289. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
290. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
291. Id at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Jamin B. Raskin, Supreme Court Veers Right on Race, NEWSDAY, July 11,
1996, at A49.
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its progeny.293 He argued that the majority took the exceedingly
persuasive justification language of Hogan and separated it from
its traditional analysis of whether the discriminatory means are
substantially related to important governmental objectives.
294
Justice Scalia's primary criticism was that the Court raised the
intermediate scrutiny standard to strict scrutiny.295 Justice Scalia
located the Court's application of strict scrutiny in a footnote; a
footnote that limited the precedential value of VMI to "'unique...
educational opportunities. 296  This begs the question: what is a
unique educational opportunity? Justice Scalia interpreted this
footnote not as a limitation but as an invitation to eradicate single-
sex institutions.297 The crux of his criticism was that "the single-sex
program that will not be capable of being characterized as 'unique'
is not only unique but nonexistent. ' 2 s Thus, Justice Scalia feared
that all single-sex education institutions would be forced to inte-
grate; he argued that "single-sex public education is functionally
dead" because "[n]o state official in his right mind will buy such a
high-cost, high-risk lawsuit by commencing a single-sex pro-
gram.
29
V. THE AFTERMATH OF VMI
Moments after the decision was released on June 16, 1996, "a
handful of journalists gathered in the Supreme Court press room
derisively chuckled at the new standard, wondering out loud what
it meant."3° While Justice Scalia's fears of change may be exag-
gerated, he raised the critical issue of VMI's impact and implemen-
tation.
From a feminist jurisprudence perspective, the impact of Jus-
tice Ginsburg's debut opinion was cause for celebration."1 One
supporter described the opinion as a "watershed decision for
293. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
294. See iL at 2294.
295. See id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. See id- at 2276.
297. See id at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion assures that no such
experiment will be tried again.").
298. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
299. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
300. Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 9.
301. See Raskin, supra note 292, at A49 ("The court's resounding 7-1 decision re-
quiring the Virginia Military Institute to open its doors to women amounts to a
'Brown v. Board of Education' in the gender field.").
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women's rights.,,312 While its full meaning is still unknown,33 the
decision clearly expanded opportunities for women at VMI and
elsewhere. Despite the decision's theoretical advancement of gen-
der equality, it provides little guidance for achieving equality in its
implementation. As the following discussion indicates, both VMI
and The Citadel struggle to carry out the Court's mandate to pro-
vide men and women equal opportunity for a military-style educa-
tion.
Two days after VMI's all-male admissions policy was ruled
unconstitutional, South Carolina's Citadel voluntarily agreed to
admit women .3 4 At both The Citadel and VMI, new recruits face
enormous challenges. Many of these challenges focus on the
treatment of men and women: will the sexes be treated alike or
differently? It appears that, at least initially, men and women at
VMI will receive the same treatment.3 0 5 For example, women at
VMI will be given buzz cuts like men. In contrast, the first four
women admitted at The Citadel received only short hair cuts-"off
the face, off the shoulders, off the collar and with the ears show-
ing.,
306
The more difficult challenge is how male and female cadets
will get along with each other. Three of the four women at The
Citadel disliked their short haircuts for making them different
from men and took the controversial step of giving themselves
buzz cuts.3 7 The punishment these women received for giving
302. Margo L. Ely, Court's VMI Decision Reinforces Review Standard for Sex
Bias, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 8, 1996, at 6. But see Hope Viner Samborn, Scrutiny
Scrutinized, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 29, 29 ("[S]ome feminists fear that heightened
scrutiny... may harm rather than assist women in attacking sex discrimination....
because the VMI standard may be used in reverse discrimination cases to attack af-
firmative action programs-some of which are designed to give women parity with
men.").
303. Pursuant to Scalia's dissent, there is speculation that the decision may jeop-
ardize all single-sex education. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Closing Argument: Did Ginsburg
Go Too Far in VMI Case?, Tax. LAW., July 8, 1996, at 21, 21. This prospect "is es-
pecially troubling at a time when many educational experts and some feminists are
citing powerful evidence that single-sex education can benefit boys and girls alike."
Id. Taylor posits that the VMI decision may lead to a double standard favoring
women. Id. Such a standard would allow compensatory or remedial single-sex pro-
grams only for females. Id.
304. See Women Begin a New Era at The Citadel, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at
A26.





1370 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
themselves buzz cuts3 ' exemplifies the institution's resistance to
men and women being treated the same.
Hazing rituals that female recruits were subjected to also cre-
ated tension; two female cadets at The Citadel had nail polish
poured on them and their clothes set afire on three occasions."
These incidents came to light only after a male cadet reported
them to school officials.31° Why the women chose not to report the
incidents is cause for speculation and concern. Did the women's
fear of retaliation inhibit their ability to look out for their own
well-being? Was the pressure to conform so intense that they were
willing to give up their physical safety? Most recently, two female
cadets who endured the violent hazing did not return to The Cita-
del to complete their freshman year. While one decided not to
return out of fear for her safety, the other explained that "while I
might be physically safe on campus, I would not be welcome."3 2
VMI was not as quick as The Citadel to respond to the Court's
decision: "VMI had put off acting while it weighed the possibility
of going private to preserve its traditions and discipline. 3 13 Three
months after the VMI decision, the VMI board agreed by the nar-
rowest of margins-a nine to eight vote-to admit women by the
fall of 1997.3' 4
As a result of the negative national media coverage of its long
fight against coeducation, VMI undoubtedly faces major chal-
lenges in attracting women.1 Subsequently, VMI hired a female
admissions officer whose primary responsibility is to recruit
women.316 In VMI's revised admissions policy, applicants will be
308. See id.
309. See 2 Female Cadets Said Set Afire 3 Times, Not Once, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1996, at A38 [hereinafter 2 Female Cadets]. While neither woman was injured, at
least one was a target of other threats as well. See 2 Female Citadel Cadets' Clothes
Reportedly Set Afire, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at A16 [hereinafter Set Afire]. One
female cadet resorted to wearing a concealed tape recorder until male cadets or-
dered her to drop her pants and remove it. See 2 Female Cadets, supra, at A38.
310. See Set Afire, supra note 309, at A16.
311. See Two Female Cadets to Quit Citadel, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1997, at A13.
312. Id.
313. VMI Sounds Retreat, Votes to Admit Women in 1997, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1996, at A24.
314. See id
315. Michael Hardy, VMI Needs $5.1 Million to Go Coed, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1996, at B1.
316. See VMI Coeducation Recruitment Initiatives: VMI Hires Female Admissions
Officer (visited Nov. 24, 1996) <http://www.vmi.edu/-pr/coed.htm>.
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evaluated without regard to gender. 17 Whether cadets will con-
tinue to refer to their co-ed classmates as "Brother Rats" remains
undecided.318 While the number of women to be admitted for the
1997-1998 academic year remains undetermined, the number of
applications from prospective male students has risen signifi-
cantly,3"9 debunking the myth that coeducation would make VMI
an unappealing educational choice for young men.
VI. REVISITING ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG
A. VMI Opens the Door for a Stricter Standard of Review
It is clear that VMI represents an invitation for courts to apply
a stricter standard of review to gender classifications. However,
lower courts remain uncertain on how to apply this new standard.
Aware of the ambiguity left by VMI, the Seventh Circuit in
Nabozny v. Podlesny?2 declined to express an opinion on whether
the Court's ruling heightens the level of scrutiny applied to gender321
discrimination. Despite the Seventh Circuit's indecision, the Su-
preme Court opened the door for a more stringent application of
intermediate scrutiny, which may lead the Court to reconsider its
earlier decisions upholding gender discrimination.
B. The Executive Branch Invites Review of Rostker
While single-sex education is the obvious subject of review af-
ter VMI, women's exclusion from draft registration and some
combat positions are also appropriate targets for reconsideration.
Prior to VMI, the executive branch revisited the Rostker decision.
At President Bill Clinton's request in 1994, the Department of De-
fense 3DoD) reviewed the policy of excluding women from the
draft. At that time, the DoD concluded that women's exclusion
317. See About VMI (visited Nov. 24, 1996) <http'J/www.vmi.edu/-pr/about-
vmi.htm> ("Standards are applied without regard to gender, race, nationality, or re-
ligion, and all factors are weighed in the final determination of the applicant's quali-
fications.").
318. See id.
319. See Hardy, supra note 315, at B1.
320. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing homosexual stu-
dent to maintain an equal protection claim against school officials for alleged failure
to protect him from harassment and harm by other students).
321. See id. at 456 n.6.
322. See Women and the Draft (visited Nov. 27, 1996) <http://www.sss.gov/women.
htm>.
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from the draft was justifiable since women were excluded by policy
from front-line combat positions.323 Additionally, the DoD recog-
nized that policies regarding women must be reviewed periodically
since the role of women in the military continues to expand.324 The
VMI decision presents such an appropriate time.
C. Overturning Rostker on the Coattails of VMI
This Note advocates the reversal of Rostker v. Goldberg
325
following the VMI decision for symbolic reasons significant within
feminist jurisprudence and the upholding of the constitutional
mandate of equal protection.
1. Overturning Rostker under the feminist jurisprudential
mandate of equal citizenship
While the current Selective Service law requires only "male
person[s]" to register for the draft,326 feminists disagree over
whether including women in draft registration will advance the
cause of feminism.3n Opponents argue that women should not
participate in "the structure of militarism," but should seek to de-
molish those structures. 32 Others believe that the right to be
drafted and serve in combat-to be placed in a position to kill oth-
ers and be killed-is not a prize worth fighting for. 9 Still others
question whether draft registration is a top-priority for the feminist
movement since women who choose to join the Army do not rep-
resent a cross-section of American women.330
Despite these strong arguments for maintaining the status
quo, the following compelling symbolic reasons dictate overturn-
ing Rostker:
Outside the services, the exclusion of women from com-
bat [and the draft] serves functions that are chiefly ex-
pressive, symbolizing and reinforcing a traditional view of
femininity that subordinates women. Achieving full citi-
323. See id
324. See id.
325. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
326. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453(a) (1994).
327. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499,523 (1991).
328. See id. (quoting Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist
Jurisprudence As Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 41 (1989)).
329. See id
330. See id at 523-24 n.93.
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zenship for women in America is going to require a lot
more than ending the exclusion of servicewomen from
combat positions [and the draft], but those ... goals are in-
terrelated.31
Some feminists argue that "'combat' is a synonym for 'power"' 332
and that the combat exclusion is "protective" legislation represent-
ing paternalistic notions of women.3 33 As Catherine MacKinnon
argues, "As a citizen, I should have to risk being killed just like
you."' 4  This principle of equal citizenship mandates sex-
integration of the military and full participation by those women
who do join.335
2. Rostker's fatal flaw in constitutional theory: overbreadth
Under the mandate of equal protection after VMI, there is no
exceedingly persuasive justification to uphold the ban on draft
registration in light of women's large-scale involvement in the mili-
tary.3 36 While women's exclusion from combat once justified
women's exclusion from the draft,337 that justification is unaccept-
able after VMI; such justification relies on overbroad generaliza-
tions specifically prohibited by VMI.
38
These overbroad generalizations regarding the role of women
in the military are debunked by the DoD's report entitled Peace-
time Draft Registration and the Selective Service System (SSS),339
331. Id. at 525.
332- Id. at 524 (quoting HELEN ROGAN, MIXED COMPANY: WOMEN IN THE
MODERN ARMY 296 (1981)). Women are deprived of this power because the combat
ban (1) bars women from experience needed to advance to important leadership po-
sitions; (2) limits women's access to training and employment opportunities; (3) pro-
duces tokenism resulting from the limit on the total number of women who can be
admitted to the services; (4) marginalizes women in support roles; and (5) subjects
women to sexual harassment resulting from their limited numbers. See id. at 524-25.
333. Id. at 523 n.93 (quoting Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Re-
flections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 187-89
(1982)).
334. MacKinnon, supra note 123, at 83.
335. See Karst, supra note 327, at 523-24.
336. Overturning Rostker to end the ban on women's exclusion from draft regis-
tration does not necessarily end the ban against women from serving in combat posi-
tions. However, combat and the draft are deeply interrelated such that ending the
ban on both is crucial to advancing the position of women in the military.
337. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78-79.
338. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,2275 (1996).
339. See Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense to Director of Selec-
tive Service System (Nov. 16, 1994) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view) [hereinafter 1994 DoD Report].
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women recruits in the armed services reached an all-time high of
sixteen percent.40 Furthermore, the DoD estimated that over the
next five years the number of women on active duty would reach
almost a quarter of a million.4' While women may be prohibited
from engaging in direct ground-combat, they "are now an integral
part of world-wide deployable combat and combat support
units. ' 42 With the opening of increasing numbers of positions in
the military to women, including combat and combat-support po-
sitions, 3 the success of the armed services "now 'depends' on the
participation of a great number of America's high quality of young
women.
,, 4
Most significantly, the 1994 DoD Report invites continued
debate over women's exclusion from draft registration. 5 The re-
port concedes that much of the congressional debate surrounding
the exclusion of women from draft registration "would be inap-
propriate today." Should there be a draft, the legality of the ex-
clusion of women would foreseeably be contested in the courts,
moving almost immediately to the United States Supreme Court,
"which may be disposed to rule otherwise than it did in Rostker v.
Goldberg."37 When all but ground-combat positions are open to
women, their inclusion in the draft will be inevitable.m
While VMI does not address the Court's policy of deference
to military affairs cases, given the opportunity to revisit Rostker,
the Court's primary obstacle in overturning the case is its obliga-
tion to follow precedent according to the doctrine of stare deci-




343. Over 99% of Air Force jobs, 94% of Navy positions, 62% of Marine jobs,
and 67% of Army jobs are open to women. See id. Of the 1.2 million jobs available




347. The Selective Service System: Hearing Before the House VA, HUD, and In-
dep. Agencies Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 462 (1996)
(statement of Philip L. Borkholder, Executive Director, National Interreligious
Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO)).
348. See id.
349. The Court enunciated a four-factor inquiry to reexamine a prior holding:
unworkability, reliance, evolution of legal principles, and changes in factual assump-
tions. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (upholding a
woman's right to abortion as established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), on
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combined with changes in factual assumptions since the Rostker
decision enable the Court to overcome the stare decisis hurdle.
The exceedingly persuasive justification requirement of VMI, as
interpreted by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia,35 1 leads to the con-
clusion that Rostker is "a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional
thinking., 35 ' If today's armed forces are increasingly gender neu-
tral,35 2 shouldn't draft registration also be gender neutral? The all-
male draft represents the last great bastion of man as woman's
protector and defender.353
In addition to changes in legal precedent, shifting social stan-
dards also control constitutional analysis.354 The factual assump-
tions of Rostker are no longer accurate; Justice Rehnquist's asser-
tion that "women are excluded from combat, 355 is no longer a
truism. While public opinion polls indicate that the American
people strongly support prohibiting women from combat positions,
reality dictates otherwise.356 Although women are barred from
one-third of all Army jobs, women can hold certain combat posi-
tions in the Navy and Air Force.3s In the wake of the 1990 Persian
Gulf War, women have been permitted to fly Army helicopters.
358
However, women still cannot become infantry soldiers-"the
backbone of the Army.,
35 9
As a result of women's exclusion from infantry positions, a
glass ceiling exists thatprevents women from becoming senior
generals in the Army.3  Male senior generals who come up
stare decisis principles despite subsequent maternal health care advances):
[Wohen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily
ormed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to
test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule.
of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a
prior case.
350. See supra Part IV.F.5.
351. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (denying that Roe v. Wade is a survivor of such ob-
solete constitutional thinking).
352. See 1994 DoD Report, supra note 339.
353. See supra text accompanying note 2.
354. See TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-26, at 1565. But cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869
(refusing to overturn Roe despite a possible new social consensus on the abortion
issue).
355. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,77 (1981).
356. See Sheryl Stolberg & Melissa Healy, Harassment Is Old Battle for Many
Army Women, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,1996, at Al.
357. See id.; see also supra note 343 (describing Navy and Air Force jobs open to
women).
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through infantry, armor, and artillery commands are viewed as
"warriors." Thus, "[i]f you say women aren't going to be warriors,
then you are saying we are not going to have a woman who is chief
of staff of the Army.,
361
Indeed, many female soldiers break some societal molds sim-
ply by joining the armed forces. However, once they are there,
they tend to be channeled into fields that are traditionally the
province of women.362 More than one-third of women go into ad-
ministrative jobs, about one-sixth enter medical occupations, and
nearly one-quarter become supply clerks or communications spe-
cialists. 63 Only about ten percent join occupations traditionally
seen as men's work, such as electronics, craft work, and infantry
support.364 Despite these trends in female professional tracks in
the armed forces, women's status will continue to improve as a re-
sult of their sheer numbers. Breaking down the remaining legal
barriers preventing women's advancement is essential to achieving
real equality.
VII. CONCLUSION
The history of VMI is a classic example of the difficulties
courts face in grappling with gender differences. The district
court's reliance on gender differences to exclude women from
VMI exemplifies the current backlash against feminist theory in an
effort to stymie women's access to male-dominated environ-
361. Id.
362. See id. The same is true for women in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF),
which drafts both men and women. The IDF reinforces traditional sex roles by
placing men in the battlefield and women behind desks: "[Tihe whole point of hav-
ing women in the army is to free men for combat." Kirk Spitzer, Commission Hears
of Myth of Israeli Women of War, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, June 26, 1992. Tradi-
tional sex roles are entrenched by the Israeli military's organizational structure,
which separates women into a separate corps-the Women's Corps, whose acronym
is CHEN, which translates as "charm." See Irit P. Garshowitz, Leader of Israeli
Women's Corps Defends Ban on Combat Roles, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 1992, at 5. The
Women's Corps is a sham: "The Women's Corps is not a corps in the true sense of
the term, but rather an administrative cadre governing training assignments and mili-
tary careers of women in the IDF." Anne R. Bloom, Women in the Defense Forces,
in CALLING THE EQUALITY BLUFF 128, 135 (Swirski & Safir eds., 1991). One new
recruit describes the accepted view of women in the Israeli army as the "zic
('spark'-of love, of hope, of passion) and the chic [of] the military." Gail Hareven,
His Army Her Army: Women in the Israeli Military, LILITH, Winter 1991, at 9, 9.
363. See Stolberg & Healy, supra note 356, at Al.
364. See icL Experts agree that the structure of jobs gives rise to rampant sexual
harassment. See id.
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ments.3 ' Even when courts confront discrimination and require
remedial action, they are reluctant to provide women with oppor-
tunities on the same turf as their male counterparts.3 By creating
VWIL as a parallel institution, Virginia argued that it was pursuing
diversity in education. Such an objective certainly qualifies as an
important governmental interest and would have been upheld if
the Supreme Court had taken the deferential approach advocated
by the Fourth Circuit's special intermediate scrutiny test.367 How-
ever, the VMI case marks a turning point in feminist jurisprudence
and constitutional theory by rendering separate and unequal fa-
cilities for men and women unconstitutional.
If Justice Rehnquist's or Justice Scalia's spin on VMI-that
the Court is moving toward a more stringent level of scrutiny-is
even remotely accurate, then it is almost certain that given the op-
portunity the Court will overturn Rostker. The key hurdle will not
be in the more skeptical application of intermediate scrutiny.
Rather it will be for the Court to grant certiorari by choosing to
hear a case that addresses the issue of women's involvement, or
lack thereof, in the draft and combat. In order for this to occur,
the Court must cease to defer to Congress on issues involving the
military. Skeptical scrutiny will simply be the coup de grace in
overturning Rostker's outmoded conception of women's involve-
ment in the military. In light of the increased involvement of
women in combat and combat-related positions, there appears to
be no exceedingly persuasive justification to uphold the exclusion
of women from draft registration and ultimately from the draft.
The increased involvement of women in the military proves that
365. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and
remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
366. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and
remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471
(W.D. Va. 1994), affd and remanded, 44 F.3d 1226 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd and re-
manded, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
367. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1237.
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today's women are eager to share in the benefits and the burdens
of our nation's armed forces and of our society.
Karen Lazarus Kupetz*
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